Shapere's criticism is plausible. If the concepts of mass, space, and time in Einstein's theory of relativity are not identical to Newton's concepts, in that they are embedded in different conceptual schemes and different networks of laws; then it is reasonable to say Hamiltonian mechanics and Hertzian are quite different from Newtonian mechanics in their concepts or semantics, since they too employ laws and conceptual schemes different from Newton's. Thus can we really say that these theories are logically equivalent to Newton's, offering only structural and aesthetic advantages? If the theory of relativity is revolutionary compared with Newtonian mechanics, why can't we consider Hamiltonian and Hertzian mechanics revolutionary as well? Where is the line that marks the differences between Einstein's and Newton's concepts as being more significant than the differences between Hertz's or Hamilton's and Newton's concepts? In this paper, I will introduce the notion of a "theory version" as an aid to resolving these problems. Specifically, various formulations of a theory in normal science are different "theory versions," which share certain similarities or "family resemblance."
These similar formulations constitute a "family" of theory versions. A theory is usually a family of theory versions. For example, all of Newton's, Lagrange's, Hamilton's, and Hertz's formulations of mechanics are various theory versions of classical mechanics, and they share a family resemblance. Einstein's theory of relativity is a different family of theory versions. The notion of family resemblance, I suggest, explains significant differences between the concepts applied various theory versions. We can thus construct a conceptual model to answer the two central problems identified above by means of the three notions of a theory version, a family of theory versions, and family-resemblance.
These notions are in fact suggested by Shapere's remarks, though he did not develop them in the manner presented here. Developing a complete solution to these two problems is a complex task, one that would take us the scope of this short paper. Hence here I will focus only on the first problem and on the notion of a theory version. My topic can thus be analyzed into the following questions. What is a theory version, and how do we identify one? How should we characterize a complete theory version, and show that any two theory versions in one family of theory versions are similar to each other?
. The Characterization of Theory Versions
A theory version is a formulation of a theory by one scientist in a manner different from that of other scientists. But a theory version within a family is not revolutionary compared to other versions within the same family. In contrast to theory versions, a revolutionary theory always establishes a new family. Of course, it is possible for a theory version that is originally part of one to provide the basis for the development of a new family. In this case, the theory version may be a relatively remote one compared to focus on the process of science, are different from those presented here, which focus on the structure of theories. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for calling my attention to Shapere's development of his ideas.
other more central versions, or part of the theory may be applied to a entirely new field, yielding a new family distinct from but related to the original family. 4 When a single scientist proposes a new set of formulations or expressions, he constructs a new version. In doing so, he is reformulating the original (or paradigmatic) theory and rearranging the network of scientific terms applied to explain or describe objects. Reformulating and rearranging involve modifying the concepts and meanings expressed by the original set of scientific terms, for a set of formulations always involves a whole system or network of concepts. In other words, a new version differs from the original not only in its logic and syntax, but also in its concepts and semantics.
Besides a network of concepts, a theory version also involves a system for classifying its subject, and different theory versions may employ different classifications. As an example, consider motion in mechanics. Newton divided motion into two basic classes:
inertial (unforced or force-balanced) motion and forced motion. In Hertz's version, all motions are "free motion," which corresponds to Newton's inertial motion.
5 Another example is light beams in the wave theory of light. Different scientists in the 19th century produced different classifications of light beams with respect to a property called "polarization." 6 So a new theory version may reclassify the subject of an old one.
We can justify the above claims and clarify the structure of theory versions by drawing on Kuhn's and Hacking's recent works. Kuhn's later notions of scientific terms, lexical structure, and taxonomic structure (Kuhn 1983 (Kuhn , 1987a (Kuhn , 1987b (Kuhn , 1989 (Kuhn , 1990 7 as well as
Hacking's more formalized proposals concerning scientific kinds, taxonomic trees, and the logic of kinds (Hacking 1993) 8 jointly provide the basic conceptual instruments for 5 The example will be clarified below.
6 See Buchwald (1992 ), Xiang Chen (1995 . 7 Kuhn's notion of taxonomy arose from his continued attempts to justify some version of the incommensurability thesis. Most of Kuhn's more philosophical work since SSR was devoted to clarifying and justifying the concept of incommensurability between competing theories (Kuhn 1970a (Kuhn , 1970b (Kuhn , 1979 (Kuhn , 1983 (Kuhn , 1987a (Kuhn , 1987b (Kuhn , 1989 (Kuhn , 1990 . In the 1980s, Kuhn defined "incommensurability" as "untranslatability" and applied the notion of lexical or taxonomic structure to interpret incommensurability between scientific paradigms. The new paradigm adopted in the wake of a scientific revolution is incommensurable with the old one precisely because the lexicon of the new paradigm is untranslatable into that of the old one.
analyzing the network of concepts and classifications in a theory version. However, neither Hacking's approach nor Kuhn's original proposal yield a complete analysis of the structure of a theory version. To clarify the structure of scientific theories more completely, we need a new type of classification, which I will call "categorization."
Categorization is distinct from taxonomic classification. Categorization is the division of items in the world into categories. Linguistically, it is equivalent to a classification of predicates. Categorization in a scientific theory refers to the most fundamental classification of the object-world intended by the theory.
"Categorization" and "taxonomy" are two types of organizational patterns implicit in the structure of any scientific theory. By examining these patterns, we can expose the structure of theory versions. The next section will explain how categorization differs from taxonomy, clarify the characteristics and lexical structures of categorization and taxonomy, and illustrate how these two patterns organize a scientific theory on the basis of its parts. The ultimate aim of the discussion is to provide a more complete picture of thought Hacking's interpretation failed to capture his real claims (Kuhn 1993, pp. 315-19) , a number of historians and philosophers of science adopted Hacking's approach of taxonomic trees and applied it to the history of physics (See Buchwald (1992 ), Xiang Chen (1995 ), Daiwie Fu (1995 ), and Anderson (1996 .). These writers showed that Hacking's taxonomic approach could be used to articulate the notion of incommensurability between an old theory and a new one. theory versions.
３ ３ ３ ３. The Structure of Theory Versions: Categorization and Taxonomy
A categorization is a system of categories. In this paper, the concept of category is used in its ancient Greek sense. 9 "Categorization" in Aristotle's sense of a category-scheme is a primitive feature of scientific theories. A scientific theory always involves classifying the object-world studied by scientists into several basic categories, such as individual, property, relation, space, time, and behaviour, and then finding laws that describe appropriate relations among those categories. Finding laws linking the basic categories is equivalent to define the meanings of the categories. Classifying and defining are thus two fundamental functions of categorization.
The categorization inherent in a scientific theory always yields a category-scheme. The laws of motion in classical mechanics, for example, classify the object-world into categories such as body, mass, force, position, velocity, and motion, and they stipulate the interrelations among these categories, forming a relational network. This is the most fundamental classification of and connection to the object-world in classical mechanics.
Within the basic categorization of a scientific theory, a category can be reclassified into several subcategories, a subcategory can be reclassified into sub-subcategories, and so on.
The category of "body" in classical mechanics, for example, can be divided into particle, rigid body, fluid, etc.; the category of "force" into central force, constraint force, collision force, etc.; "motion" into equilibrium of particles, motion along a straight line, motion in a plane, rotation, periodic motion, etc. 10 This type of classification is performed within a single basic category. At one level, the items that are classified are homogeneous, possessing certain common properties that allow them to be classified as a single higher-level kind. But they also possess certain different properties on the basis of which they can be classified into several lower-level kinds. In this classification, a single basic category is divided into several subcategories, as the trunk of a tree might divide into several branches, then each subcategory may be divided into several sub-subcategories, as a large branch may divide into smaller branches, and so on. The classifying then produces a stratified hierarchy of concepts, which is typically called a taxonomy or a 10 This is a classification of motion presented in a university textbook, Sears, et al., University Physics taxonomic tree. This is just classification in the ordinary sense, and the outcome of such a classification is a taxonomy. We will call the subcategories and sub-subcategories produced "kinds," because the relation between a subcategory and its sub-subcategory is a "kind of" relation.
The major differences between categorization and taxonomy are these. Taxonomy is a type of homogeneous classification, in which the classified items are homogeneous individuals or kinds. There may be borderline cases of items that could belong to either of two mutually adjacent kinds. The relation between a "trunk-kind" and its "branch-kinds" is generally a "genus-species" or "kind of" relation. In a categorization system, on the other hand, the classified members are sharply separate categories, such as individual, quantity, relation, and behaviour. There is no hierarchy or stratification among these basic categories. All the categories in a scientific theory form an interlocking network that "frames" the world in a way that guides scientists' perceptions, information sorting, and interpretation of phenomena.
How does a theory version categorize and classify? Taxonomic classification and categorization must both follow certain guidelines, but those for the former are different from those for the latter. The guidelines for taxonomic classification are derived from the features of the classified objects. They typically refer to the shape, function, expression, organization, structure, or types of behaviour of objects -that is, the predicates describing the objects in various categories. 11 Categorization doesn't appeal to these types of classificatory guidelines, but to the structure of scientific laws or equations. In other words, the scientific laws or equations in a scientific theory provide that theory's categorization rules and the structure of laws or equations provides an implicit scheme of we ask what kind of motion is periodic motion, the answer is motion produced by a particle subjected to a force in the direction opposite the particle's direction of movement, where the impressed force is a function of position. (The formulation is F(x) = -kx.)
The taxonomy of the subjects of Newtonian mechanics can be depicted as shown in Let me now integrate the concepts of elementary categories, secondary categories, and 14 Cf. Hertz (1956) , Principle of Mechanics. Hertz's version of mechanics is usually regarded an axiomatization of classical mechanics. He constructed an axiomatic system and showed that all the concepts needed could be reduced to the three basic concepts of mass, space, and time. In other words, we can define all the other concepts (secondary categories) in a mechanical system through these three fundamental, undefined concepts (elementary categories). (Cf. Dugás, Rene (1955 , 1988 From the categorical point of view, "matter" in Hertz's mechanics is also an elementary category in addition to mass, space, and time.
the holistic meaning network into a taxonomic system. 15 If we take as an example
Newtonian mechanics as presented in many university physics textbooks, the result is the taxonomy-and-categorizations in secondary categories. The category that the heads of arrows point to is the definiendum, and the categories away from which the arrows point are the definiens. Newton's second law of motion, for example, is stated as "force" equals the product of mass times acceleration. We can say that "force" is defined in terms of "mass" and "acceleration," so the arrows point from "mass" and "acceleration" to "force". 16 Similarly, "mass" is defined in terms of "volume" and "density"; "volume" in terms of "space"; "momentum" in terms of "mass" and "velocity" together; and "velocity" in terms of "space (position)"
and "time". Thus we have an explicit network of meaning, with elementary and 16 One question that may arise here -suggested to me by an anonymous referee -is why "accerlation" and "state" are not elementary categories, since "acceleration" is an necessary item for constructing mechanical principle? Although mass, force, and acceleration are interconnected in Newton's second law, acceleration is essentially just the differential of velocity. Since the concept of acceleration is based on those of velocity and time, and it seems incorrect to place it among the elementary category. Moreover, "acceleration" plays hardly any significant role in Newton's own version of mechanics. Ideally, elementary category should play a role analogous to that of undefined primitive terms in an axiomatic system. But most scientists prefer to treat some categories as elementary in their version without actually formulating a rigorous axiomatic system to express their version. In this regard, Hertz is one of an exclusive minority. As to "state", N. Nersessian (1989) and P. Thagard (1992) secondary categories defining one another.
The figure shows explicitly that the meaning of any category term is defined by other category-terms, as each category-term is linked to other category-terms by scientific laws that provide the meaning of each term. All the category-terms in a scientific theory thus form an interlocking, holistic network of meaning. Changing the meaning of any one category-term involves modifying this holistic network of meaning.
Kinds are the results of classification within each category, and all kinds form a tree-shaped hierarchy. Our main concern here is with the vertical relation between kinds.
As described earlier, this vertical relation is a "kind of" or "belonging" relation. That is, if X is a trunk and Y is a branch emerging from trunk X, then Y is "a kind of" X. (Y belongs to the kind X.) Thus the meaning of the kind-term Y is part of the meaning of the kind-term X. When a taxonomic tree changes its topological shape -that is, some sub-kind is grafted onto an alternative "branch" or the order of any "trunk-branch" is rearranged; the meaning of the kind-term grafted or rearranged will change because of the new topological shape. Then the meanings of all the terms in the new taxonomy will be somewhat different from those in the old taxonomy. In other words, the lexical structure of a taxonomic system is holistic, too. A change in the meaning of any kind-term may result a holistic change in the meaning of the entire categorization and taxonomic system, because the equations or theorems that provide the guidelines for categorization are sometimes derived from the taxonomy within a category. Considered separately, however, the meaning network of a taxonomy is quite different from that of a categorization scheme. This is one of the major reasons for distinguishing between categorization and taxonomy. Although this approach is insufficient to reveal the relation of "family-resemblance" among all members of a family of theory versions, it is at least sufficient for us to see that a later version isn't merely an articulation of the paradigmatic theory in syntax and logic, but rather a different theory version in terms of its semantics and concepts. Our examples will be Newton's and Hertz's versions of mechanics. Axioms" includes some basic definitions of terms, a scholium, the three laws of motion (axioms), six corollaries and another scholium. All the other parts consist of lemmas,
propositions, computations, proofs, and elucidation of propositions, corollaries, and 17 The editorial structure or arrangement of scientific literature usually implies a taxonomy intended by a scientist who is writing scientific papers or books that express his system or theory, and thus implicitly reveal the taxonomic structure of the subjects of the theory. Editorial structure is thus the best starting-point for discovering the structure of a scientific theory expressed in a scientific paper or book. D1. The quantity of matter is the measure of the same, arising from its density and bulk conjointly.
D2. The quantity of motion is the measure of the same, arising from the velocity and quantity of matter conjointly.
D3. The vis insita (inertia), or innate force of matter, is a power of resisting, by which every body, as much as in its lies, continues in its present state, whether it be of rest, or of moving uniformly forwards in a right line.
D4. An impressed force is an action exerted upon a body, in order to change its state, either of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line.
D5
. A centripetal force is that by which bodies are drawn or impelled, or any way tend, 25 towards a point as to a centre.
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It is explicit that D1 and D2 define "mass" and "momentum" in a quantitative or measurable sense. D3, D4, and D5, prima facie, seem to give the defined terms only qualitative meanings. We must, however, note that Newton also gave them measurement methods and proportional meanings in his supplemental elucidation. Thus all these terms were defined and used in a quantitative sense, unlike the custom in the Aristotelian tradition. In the scholium following these definitions, Newton distinguished absolute space and time from relative space and time.
As these definitions give the basic terms measurable meanings, the axioms, that is, Newton's three famous laws of motion (Ibid. p.13), tie these terms together further into a network of meanings.
L1: Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. 19 The definition of "centripetal force" already occurred on "De motu corporum in gyrum" which was the basis for Principles. The word "centripetal,"which Newton coined to contrast with Huygens'
"centrifugal force," is regarded as the most great keyword of Principles. See Westfall (1980) , p.411.
L2: The change of motion is proportional to the motive force impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed.
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L3: To every action there is always an equal reaction; or, the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.
It is obvious that "Definitions and Axioms" provides the lexical structure and principles of Newton's theory version. Although Newton's original statements are not simply and clearly the mathematical equations known in today's general textbooks, they still weave a loose network of meaning. On the one hand, the laws of motion are the principles of Newton's theory version; on the other hand, they also link partial meanings to the whole network of meaning by linking basic terms to each other. Thus, we can say that these basic terms represent the elementary categories of Newton's version: the terms are mass (defined in terms of volume and density), momentum (defined in terms of mass and velocity), motion, force, time, space, and body. Some of these can be reclassified into several subcategories; e.g., "force" can be reclassified into "inertial force," "impressed force," "centripetal force," and "pressure," etc.; "body" into "particle," "general body,"
and "fluid" (any body whose parts yield to any force impressed on it. (p. 290)) The conceptual scheme of Newton's theory version can be depicted as shown in Figure 3 . The taxonomy and the categorization shown in the above figure jointly schematize the whole system of concepts in Newton's theory version.
Classical Mechanics: Hertz's Theory Version 21
Classical mechanics reached its zenith in the late 19th century. J. C. Adam and Jean Le Verrier's discovery of Neptune gave strong support to Newtonian mechanics.
Contemporary scientists seemed to feel that research on classical mechanics was approaching its endpoint, and there would soon be no remaining research problems. Thus they began to turn their attention to philosophical problems such as the logic or the reality of objects represented by some of the concepts within mechanics. Some scientists endeavored to find a more coherent, complete theory formulation by rearranging key concepts according to their philosophical views. A good example is Ernst Mach's criticism of Newton's notions of mass, absolute space and time, and the third law of motion (Mach 1960, pp.247-297 ). Hertz's theory version was a product of this reflective atmosphere. Of course, these philosophical and logical motives led not only to logical (syntactical) and aesthetic effects but also to semantic and conceptual changes. Hertz was a philosophical scientist. He was a neo-Kantian, but his thought tended toward positivism. He believed in the reality of a priori knowledge and also claimed that the test of truth is empirical. 22 The distinguishing feature of Hertz's theory version is its very pure form of axiomatization: The entire theory version is founded on three primitive terms: mass, space, and time. with each other in respect of (logically) permissibility, correctness, and appropriateness. (Hertz 1956, p.4) The "images of things" here refers to "various conceptions of things" 23 or "a conceptual scheme" in the terms of this paper. The entire quotation tells us that different principles will produce different images and the best image is one that satisfies three requirements: logically permissibility, correctness, and appropriateness. For Hertz, "logically permissibility" means that the images of things cannot contradict the laws of thought. But a logically permissible image may be incorrect, because the essential relations between its concepts may contradict the relations between external things.
Moreover, a more appropriate image pictures more essential relations than an alternative, and the most appropriate image is one that contains the smallest number of superfluous or empty relations (see Hertz 1956, p. 2) .
To satisfy these requirements, Hertz adopted a monotonous, complicated method of giving definitions. That is, each time he introduced a new term, he gave a definition by using terms defined in the preceding contexts. This method ensured that every significant term was based on previously justified concepts. Since mechanics needs mathematical language, the most fundamental definitions can be reduced to mathematics. Hence Hertz said, "I have naturally discussed those relations which follow simply and necessarily from the definitions adopted and from mathematics" (Ibid. p. 35). These most fundamental definitions and mathematical propositions can be regarded as "a priori"
judgements that are independent of any experience. Hertz further expanded these "a priori judgements" to the empirical domain and finally into the whole theory version.
Thus the editorial structure of Principles of Mechanics was designed in accordance with certain philosophical views. This is reflected on the division of the work into three major parts: the Introduction, Book One, and Book Two. The Introduction introduces Hertz's philosophical premises for constructing a new form of mechanics. 24 Book One, Geometry and Kinematics of Material Systems, contains all material that could be considered "a priori kinematics." Book Two, Mechanics of Material Systems, covers "empirical dynamics."
Book One contains seven chapters. At the beginning, Hertz explicitly claims, "The subject-matter of the first book is completely independent of experience. All the assertions made are a priori judgements in Kant's sense. They are based upon the laws of the internal intuition of, and upon the logical form followed by, the person makes the assertions." (Ibid. p.45) Chapter One contains four intuitive definitions, of material particle, mass, material point, a system of material points. In Chapter Two, "positions and displacements of points and systems," together with Chapter Three, "Infinitely small displacements and paths of a system of material points," Hertz defines and discusses three spatial notions of position, displacement, and path (or the notions that are defined by the notion of space). The subject of Chapter Four is modal space and that of Chapter
Five is special kinds of paths, such as "straightest paths," "shortest paths," and "geodestic paths," etc. Chapter Six is aimed at "the straightest distance in holonomous systems."
Only in Chapter Seven, titled "Kinematics," does Hertz move on to kinematics. Here he discourse without mathematics, and then argued they cannot satisfy all three requirements of permissibility, correction, and appropriateness. (Hertz 1956, pp. 4-24) defines the four parameters of motion, velocity, acceleration, momentum, and energy.
Hertz's dynamics is developed in Book Two. Chapter One includes the empirical or operational definitions of space, time, and mass. In Chapter Two, Hertz states the fundamental law of mechanics as follows: "Every free system persists in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straightest path." (Ibid. p. 144), which is the sole principle of Hertz's theory version, covering kinematics and dynamics. Hertz immediately explains:
Every motion of a free material system, or of its parts, which is consistent with the fundamental law, we call a natural motion of the system in contradistinction to its conceivable and possible motions. Thus mechanics treats of the natural motion of free material systems and their parts. (pp.144-145) This quote obviously shows that all motion in nature, for Hertz, is motion of free material systems and their parts. Chapter Three, therefore, treats of general properties of free systems, such as conservation of energy, least acceleration, shortest path, and shortest time. These topics still count as empirical kinematics, in contrast to the subject of Book One. But the empirical dynamics is grounded on the empirical kinematics, which is in turn grounded on a priori kinematics and geometry, so Hertz's mechanics can be seen 35 as reducing dynamics to kinematics and even geometry.
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To begin from Chapter Four, Hertz discusses genuinely dynamical phenomena, which were regarded as "forced motion" in traditional mechanics. From Hertz's perspective, so-called forced motion is really a kind of "motion of unfree systems." "Unfree system" means "a portion of a more extended free system." So an "unfree system" is a "partial system," and a "free system" is a "complete system." "Unfree systems" are divided into two classes, guided systems and coupled systems. The latter corresponds to "systems acted on by forces" in traditional mechanics. "Force", therefore, is defined by Hertz as "the independently conceived effect which one of two coupled systems, as a consequence of the fundamental law, exerts upon the motion of the other." (Ibid. p.185) Thus in Hertz's eyes, it seems that force isn't real, but is only a "conceived effect." In other words, Hertz uses the notion of a "coupled system" to eliminate the reality of "force." Following this, the subject of Chapter Five is "cyclical motion," which corresponds to "centripetal motion" in Newton's version; and that of Chapter Six is "discontinuous motion," which corresponds to the traditional "motion acted by impulses." Thus Hertz provides an explicit taxonomy of motion that can schematized as shown in Figure 5 .
motion of complete system motion of motion of guided system free system motion of partial system linear motion motion of cyclical motion coupled system discontinuous motion [Figure 5.] As to his conceptual categorization, Hertz attempted to define all mechanical concepts or terms by using three primitive concepts or terms: space, time, and mass. All First, the major difference between Hertz's version and Newton's lies in the reality and necessity of "force." Hertz's mechanics radically changes the view of "force" as the cause of motion to "force" as "conceived effect of motion." In Newton's scheme of categories, "force" is an elementary category which has many sub-kinds or sub-categories. Newton is committed to the reality and existence of "force." In Hertz's scheme of categories, there is no category of "force" which is eliminated by way of "constraint" instead of "force"
and "motion of unfree systems" instead of "forced motion." Hertz isn't committed to the reality and existence of "force." The reason for this stems from his radical positivism.
That is, the notion of "force as cause of motion" fails to be confirmed in our immediate experience. In Hertz's eyes, we never have any experience of force, but only that of motion, and then we "conceive some hidden cause" behind the motion. We call this hidden cause "force." But since it is never confirmed by our senses, force as the cause of motion is really a posit or fiction.
The second point on which we can compare the two theory versions is the topological shape of their conceptual schemes --that is, the linking lines and directed arrows in the scheme depicted. In Newton's version, for example, "force" and "momentum" are elementary categories. Newton first defines "momentum" (quantity of matter) as mass multiplied by velocity, and then defines or links "force" by way of the second law of motion, "momentum is proportional to force." Next, "velocity" is defined by "position"
and "time"; "mass" by "volume" and "density"; "volume" by "space," and so on. The system of categories is an inter-defined network. The linking lines and directed arrows among categories appear messy and disorderly. In contrast to Newton's version, Hertz's categories seem to be laid out in a careful order. Hertz is conscious of rearranging all categories by means of the axiomatic method. He defines other terms using as few primitive terms as possible. All arrows issuing from elementary categories point to secondary categories. The scheme is a simple, neat framework.
There are a number of other interesting features in the taxonomies of various categories in the two theories. Newton attaches great importance to the concept of force and is committed to its existence. Thus he divides force into many sub-categories or Finally, what we need to compare is the taxonomy of subjects. Hertz's taxonomy of motion rearranges the relation between inertial motion and forced motion. In Newton's version, inertial motion is "motion without any impressed force but only inertia," that is, it is excluded from forced motion. When we in turn mention "forced motion," we exclude all inertial motion. In Hertz's version, however, all motion is "motion of a free system" which corresponds to "inertial motion" in Newton's version. "Forced motion" in Newton's version is only a sub-kind, "motion of partial systems," which is in turn a sub-kind of "motion of free systems" in Hertz's version. That is, in Hertz's view, "forced motion" is a sub-kind of "inertial motion." Hertz didn't exploit any new kind of motion. In Lakatos' words, he didn't discover any novel fact. To sum up, Hertz's mechanics was not a revolutionary challenge to Newton's or to Newtonian mechanics, but a version of the family of formulations of classical mechanics.
７ ７ ７ ７. Conclusion
Shapere's challenge concerning the individuation paradigms raises questions concerning the relation among systems of formulations in the stages of normal science 28 As Dugás (1955 Dugás ( , 1988 said, "Hertz, above all, cared for logical and formal perfection in this matter, and willingly acknowledged that the classical presentation had a greater practical value than his own versions may be regarded as "exemplars" for the other versions. It is also possible that a successive version in some family might apply core aspects of a preceding family, so that it is in effect a "mixed" style. Hertz's version with a Cartesian face is a good instance.) If my proposals are accepted, our attention will be devoted to exploring the vicissitudes of families of theory version, in stead of paradigm shifts. On the basis of the categorization-and-taxonomy model of theory version constructed here, we can consider the developmental structure of family of theory version. We can also trace the "paths" by which a precedent version develops into successive versions, and we can explore how revolutionary versions develop from a old family and then break off a new one. The construction of this sort of model of the dynamics of scientific development is a major project, which I leave for future work.
